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5 the general issue of security and commodity pricing in segmented market settings. Second, as an important extension of the literature on Chinese cross-listed stocks, we find that increased capital account permeability underlies much of the two markets' increased price synchronization. These results complement the existing literature on global market segmentation (see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel, 2011) 6 . Third, the present study also extends the literature on the migration of stock trading in emerging market issuers (see Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998; Levine and Schmukler, 2006; Halling, Pagano, Randl and Zechner, 2007; and Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon, 2007) . Virtually all of the evidence amassed on this topic relates to settings where a clearly dominant market (in terms of capitalization and turnover) draws-in issuers from a much less developed one. We add to this literature by uncovering a time-varying pattern of price leadership for synchronized 7 cross-listings in markets of comparable size and liquidity 8 .
Moreover, we look at how information is transmitted between the world's leading emerging stock market and its closest developed rival (in terms of proximity, political connections and issuer base).
Assessment of the A-and H-cross-pricing issue is also timely given the likelihood that foreign issuers, i.e., those of non-mainland Chinese domicile, will soon be allowed to list on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). 9 It is also given greater resonance by China's ongoing capital account reform, with the "through-train" trading arrangement between Hong Kong and Shanghai (see Yiu, 2014) constituting the latest major development.
As an overview, the present study reveals beneficial long-run pricing effects wrought by capital account liberalization. First, increased QFII investment has helped promote A-price leadership. Second, 6 . The tight capital controls of earlier years, combined with excessive savings rates, combined to ensure that mainland Chinese investors' required rates of return (equity discount rates) were at much lower levels than investors' rates in international markets like Hong Kong. Chinese investors' discount rates have logically risen with the gradual easing of mainland capital account restrictions. This resonates with contentions in Bekeart et al. (2011: 3877) on globalization effects. 7 . Stock trading times overlap for much of the business day. However, HKEx closes one hour later than Shanghai and Shenzhen which suggests that closing prices on HKEx may be more informative than mainland market closing prices. 8 . According to World Federation of Exchanges' (WFE) statistics for 2010, HKEx ranked as the world's seventh largest exchange in terms of market cap (USD 2,711 billion). Shanghai/Shenzhen combined rank second with a cap value of USD 4,028 billion (see http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2010/equity-markets/domestic-market-capitalization). WFE 2010 turnover statistics reveal that Shanghai/Shenzhen combined ranked second and HKEx ninth (see http://www.worldexchanges.org/statistics/annual/2010/equity-markets/total-value-share-trading). 9 . Our analysis offers potentially important insight into the cross-border price dynamics that would likely surround the listing of non-mainland PRC companies. Media reports (see, for example, Ren, 2013) suggest that the SSE and CSRC may unveil new listing rules to allow foreign companies, i.e., entities of non-mainland Chinese domicile, to do IPO in Shanghai.
H-market price discovery processes have been galvanized by greater inward capital flows (emanating from mainland China). We thus offer strong evidence that capital account liberalization promotes stock market efficiency. Results also suggest that increased capital flow from the mainland (into Hong Kong) serves a role in weakening short-run causality effects from H-to A-share prices.
2 A non-linear causality model for cross-listed stocks
Literature review and model development
The extant literature on price discovery in cross-listed stocks mainly focuses on adjustment to a long-term equilibrium path, as typically determined by the respective series' co-integration relation (see, for example, Eun and Sabherwal's, 2003 assessment of error-correction processes for determining longterm price discovery). In contrast, studies like Gagnon and Karolyi (2009) focus on short-run effects.
They assess how trading volumes capture information spill-over for cross-listed stocks. How does one reconcile approaches like Gagnon and Karolyi's (2009) , which focus on short-run effects, with a long-run equilibrium approach? Granger's (1988) (Granger, 1988, p. 203, brackets as shown) . His discussion highlights the importance of considering both types of causality when examining co-integrated series. Most of the existing literature simply addresses the first type of causality (i.e., adjustments to the long-run equilibrium path) while ignoring the second (i.e., short-run lead-lag effects). Although some studies control for short term dynamic effects, the economic meaning of a short-run lead-lag effect is rarely discussed. One possible reason is the presumption of market efficiency and the absence therefore of systematic lead-lag effects. By definition, a causal relationship implies some level of price predictability 10 . 10 . Absolute market efficiency suggests that fundamental information is instantaneously and simultaneously impounded into both markets' prices. Market efficiency therefore precludes causality effects.
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With Engle and Granger (1987) and Granger (1988) as backdrop, we develop a framework that incorporates co-integration (error-correction) and short-run causality (predictability) effects, all within a non-linear (state dependent) framework. We develop this literature in three important ways: (1) by examining causality and co-integration effects simultaneously; (2) by incorporating a Markov-Switching (MS) dynamic to capture structural changes in the markets' time-varying causality, and (3) delving into the specific determinants of 'short' and 'long' run causality. 11 
Economic Interpretation of a Co-integration-Causality model for Cross listing stocks
We capture the basic dynamic of cross-listing price discovery by offering an initial model form.
(1) where and are the first difference of the natural logarithm of exchange rate adjusted A-and Hprices; and
is the log price difference at t-1.
The above system provides a description of the data-generating process for paired A-and Hprices. It reveals two important elements: (1) the level of error-correction in relation to the previous period's mispricing ( and ), and (2) the level of short-term causality, as reflected by parameters ( and ) 12 . In the following, we interpret both in relation to price discovery and arbitrage.
A similar framework, to the one above, figures in the study of macroeconomic issues (see, for example, Katsimbris and Miller's, 1993 study of European interest rate linkages). The model framework serves to detect one market's dominance over another. From a cross-pricing perspective, the error-11 . Through our assessment of these areas, we shed new light on the A-to H-pricing difference (see Wang and Jiang, 2004; Arquette et al., 2008; Ma et al. 2010; and Cai et al., 2011) and on cross-listing price discovery in general (see Harris et al., 1995; Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; and Gagnon and Karolyi, 2009 , 2010b . Also see Cai et al. (2011 , p. 2126 for brief review of Markov estimation approaches in relation to dual-traded securities. Girardin and Liu (2007) employ a Markov set-up in their examination of stocks straddling three markets (Mainland China, Hong Kong and the US). 12 . Our model embeds one-lag short-term causality effects. We adopt this approach because closing price change in one market (A-or H-) should, if causality effects obtain, spill-over into next-day prices. Similarly, Garbade and Silber (1983) deploy a onelag causality term in their causality model of cash and futures markets.
correction component measures the contribution to long-term price discovery. Importantly, the magnitude of error-correction in one market reflects the other's contribution to long-term price discovery. The intuition is as follows. Given that the pricing error term in Equation (1) While interpretation of error-correction coefficients is straightforward, the literature suggests some difficulty in the economic interpretation of lagged-variable coefficients (especially, and ).
In the macroeconomic context, short-term dynamics are often assumed to reflect cyclical factors, causing a time series to fluctuate around its long-term level (see Akitoby, Clements, Gupta and Inchauste, 2004) .
In cross-listing price discovery terms, short-term causality coefficients capture short-run leadership.
While leadership in long-run price discovery is driven by fundamental information, short-run leadership might derive from liquidity surges predicated on rumour or transitory sentiment effects. Such short-term effects appear much more likely in the mainland market arena where retail investors dominate. Lee, Li and Wang (2010, p. 121) , for example, highlight the overarching influence of retail investors on A-prices. They reveal that institutions account for less than 14 per cent of RMB volumes in SSE180 index stocks. By way of contrast, we note that local and overseas institutions dominate HK$ volumes on Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (see HKEx, March 2012, p. 5) . In addition, A-market investors' close proximity to issuers may exacerbate short-term trading effects. We thus posit that the Amarket leads in short-term price discovery terms, potentially causing transitory spill-over effects into Hprices. In contrast to longer-run price discovery, short-run spillovers characterize market inefficiency.
Because we incorporate both types of causality (long-run error-correction and short-term price adjustment) we are able to distinguish between two types of information leadership. If, for example, a rumour turns-out to be true and affects long-run valuations, adjustment should occur in the (long-run) error-correction coefficient. At an extreme level, where all non-synchronized price movement reflects one market capturing fundamentals more quickly than the other, short-term lead-lag coefficients should be insignificant. The two types of causality offer different implications in relation to arbitrage. First, a larger error-correction coefficient suggests a faster and more complete adjustment to equilibrium. Second, unrestricted arbitrage suggests synchronization of the two markets' short-run prices. Accordingly, there
should be an inverse association between short-term causality effects and arbitrage cost. Moreover, the existence of short-term causality presents an arbitrage opportunity. If causality runs from A-to H-prices, a technical increase in the A-price would signal an opportunity to buy the corresponding H-share today with a view to selling it at a higher price tomorrow. Naturally, the easier it is to conduct 'risky' arbitrage, the less pronounced short-term causality effects. Moreover, a range of recently-instituted capital account liberalization moves suggests greater feedback and 'risky' arbitrage trading effects in A-and H-markets.
A non-linear co-integration-causality model
As pointed out in Gagnon and Karolyi's (2010a, p. 13) survey of cross-listings, linear examination of the price dynamic may "mask" important volatile sub-periods. Unlike other studies, where structural changes are dealt with in terms of sub-period analysis (see Tian and Wan, 2004; Groenewold, Tang and Wu, 2004; Tian, 2007; Pan and Dai, 2008; and Chan, 2011), a Markov-Switching (MS) approach embeds the time-varying nature of causality in the stochastic process itself. Estimation of the MS model also enables us to delve into causality determinants. It is also more flexible than other nonlinear designs (see Cai, Faff and Shin, 2010) . Moreover, and unlike smooth transition or threshold models, a specific state variable is not required (see Rabinovitch, Silva, and Susmel, 2003) .
We combine the Markov-Switching (MS) causality model of Psaradakis, Ravn and Sola (2005) with the co-integration causality model discussed in Section 2.2. The advantage of Psaradakis et al.'s (2005) model framework is its ability to separate causality direction into four regimes. The final form of the MS co-integration causality (MSCC) model is as follows: 
In Regime 1 there is two-way causality between A-and H-shares. Regime 2 allows for only one way causality from A-to H-prices; while Regime 3 constraints causality in the opposite direction (from H to A prices). Finally, Regime 4 reflects the possibility of no causality in either direction. The MSCC model in (2) above offers three main advantages. First, states of nature are directly defined from causal relationships. This provides for a clear classification of states at each and every observation. Second, and as noted in Psaradakis et al. (2005) , the MS model allows for probabilistic inferences about regime change at multiple locations within the sample. Third, the inclusion of both error correction 13 and shortterm causality allows for separation of short-and long-run price discovery.
Following estimation, the extent of error-correction (long-term price leadership) in each market can be determined by examining the signs and significances of the error-correction coefficients in the 13 . Studies like Eun and Saberwal (2003) highlight how error correction helps in identifying price discovery.
state with highest estimated probability. At a given time t, in the state with highest estimated probability, a negative (positive) and significant error correction coefficient in the A- (H-) (Arquette et al., 2008; and Cai et al., 2011) throughout the period helped narrow the average A-and H-pricing gap.
In terms of market trading arrangements, both the A-and H-markets employ limit order systems.
Market-making systems are thus absent in both settings' stock trading systems. Settlement differences arise however with A-and H-shares subject to respective T+1 and T+2 regimes. In terms of short-sale constraints, an absolute proscription applied on all A-trades during the study period. In contrast, HKEx applied a regulated short-selling regime throughout the 1999 to 2010 period. 15 From a tax standpoint, authorities in both settings exempt stock transactions from capital gains charges. However, A-dividends are subject to standard mainland income tax rates, while H-dividends escape Hong Kong income tax but face a 10 per cent mainland withholding tax. 16 In terms of general trading costs, bid-ask spreads of Hshares are around three times higher than those on A-shares (Cai, 2004, p. 30) . Finally, in terms of price synchronization, we note trading overlap for much of the A-and H-markets' business day (see Ma et al., 2010, p. 40) . However, the market close in Hong Kong occurs one hour after the corresponding mainland market close; with continuous stock trading on HKEx (Shanghai/Shenzhen) ending at 16:00 (15:00) hours. 15 . As relevant to the beginning of our study sample, see McGuinness (1999: 78-81) for discussion of the arrangements. 16 . See Arquette et al., 2008 Arquette et al., , p. 1924 for further discussion.
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Our definition of causality is contingent on measurement interval. Granger (1988) highlights the importance of such a defined interval in the interpretation of causality effects. We choose close-to-close daily return intervals given the important reference points closing prices provide, especially in relation to derivative contracts, index valuation and the unwinding of positions. One further benefit of daily data, over intraday data, is that it allows for examination of price dynamics over long-run horizons. Studies employing intra-day data typically use short-horizons of less than one year. The day-to-day persistence of A-to H-pricing gaps provides further justification for our use of inter-day data.
Model Estimates
We estimate Equation (2) for each pair of available (62) To capture causality, and given our interest in short-term lead-lag effects, we determine a one-lag structure. Such a structure has intuitive appeal when studying lead-lag effects. It also has theoretical backing. Gagnon and Karolyi (2009) , for example, select a one lag structure in their model specification of spill-over effects in cross-listed stocks.
************************************ Table 1 ************************************ Table 1 summarizes the main parameters from MSCC estimation of Equation (2 correction. Overall, the sign of the error coefficients in all states confirms a long-run co-integration relationship between pairings. These results suggest that when A-values exceed H-, A-(H-) prices adjust downwards (upwards) in the following period to restore balance.
For short-term A-causes H-returns, as reflective of states 1 and 2, the median coefficient is -0.01 ( ), with 40 out of 62 pairs significant (at the 10% level). The small coefficient size suggests that Aprice movement has a weak causal effect on H-prices. For H-to A-causality, as reflective of states 1 and 3, the median coefficient is 0.11 ( ), with 41 out of 62 pairs significant (at the 10% level). Comparison of the two short term causality coefficients indicates stronger H-to A-causality effects on average.
Panel B reports mean transition and ergodic probabilities. The transition from one causality regime to another is guided by the transition matrix. When examining the contribution of each market to the causality regimes, we are effectively studying the realization of the transition from one causality regime to another (as guided by the relevant transitional matrices). The transition probabilities suggest considerable state-switching. Ergordic probabilities confirm that the stock pairings' price discovery relationship is most often in the state of no short-term causality (State 4). Regardless of state at time t-1, the next period with highest probability of occurrence is State 4.
Time-varying Causality
The preceding section's model estimates identify significant state-based causality effects. To achieve an aggregated time series of regime changes for each given day, we count the number of stocks that are in a given regime. Specifically, we construct four aggregated price leadership measures by combining relevant individual stock statistics for each day 18 .
Pcnt_A_contr:
Percentage of stocks in each period error-correcting in the H-market;
Pcnt_H_contr:
Percentage of stocks in each period error-correcting in the A-market;
Pcnt_A→H:
Percentage of stocks where A-causes H-;
18 . While the parameters for each stock are fixed once the regimes are estimated for a given day, different stock combinations exist in different regimes.
Percentage of stocks where H-causes A-; Fundamental (i.e., long-run) price leadership issues underlie the first two measures and technical (i.e., short-run) price leadership effects the final two. In classifying a stock into the Pcnt_A_contr (Pcnt_H_contr) regime, the error-correction coefficient in the H-(A-) share equation, in the state of highest probability, must display the correct sign (i.e., negative for A-and positive for H-return equations)
and be significant at the 5% level. In classifying a stock into Pcnt_A→H (Pcnt_H→A) regime, the causality coefficient ( ), if evident in the state of highest probability, must be positive and significant at the 5% level. Intuitively, the first two regimes variables (i.e., Pcnt_A_contr and Pcnt_H_contr) capture contributions to long-term price discovery, by counting the number of pairs for a given day in a state with correctly-signed error correction coefficients that are significant at the 5% level.
The last two variables [i.e., Pcnt_A→H (Pcnt_H→A)] capture the level of causality by counting the numbers of state-pairings with a significant causality relationship. Table 2 ************************************ Table 2 and Figure 1 ************************************
The market (A-or H-) which possesses an information advantage should act as price leader. Table 2 and Figure 1 reveal three important findings. First, the H-market has been dominant in terms of its contribution to long-term price discovery, i.e., there is a statistically greater percentage of pairings with error-corrections in the A-market. This is perhaps not too surprising given the developed nature of the Hong Kong market-place and its sophisticated institutional investor base. However, both A-and Hmarkets' contribution to long-term price discovery has gradually increased over time. Second, there are more stock pairings with short-term H-to A-causality (Pcnt_H→A) than the converse (Pcnt_A→H).
Nonetheless, Figures 1c and d show that short-run causality effects (both A-to H-and H-to A) have
gradually eased over time. Third, in relation to short-and long-run effects, much greater volatility is evident during the recent Global Financial Crisis Period. This is of interest given the growing interest in illiquidity and pricing effects during financial crises (see Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen, 2008) .
Overall, our univariate evidence questions the existence of 'home' market advantage. Instead, there is greater evidence of causality from 'foreign' (H-) to 'home' market (A-) settings. This is perhaps due to international investors' scale of trading and their reliance on fundamentals. Results are also consistent with 'noisy' trading in the 'home' market, brought-about by a dominant retail investor presence.
In sum, as the two markets' prices have converged, short-term lead-lag effects have diminished.
This is consistent with Bekaert et al.'s (2011) view that greater "financial openness" and "local financial market development" reduce market segmentation. 19 In the following section we explore the important determinants of short-and long-run pricing effects.
Determinants of Price Leadership
In relation to the overarching issue of cross-border price discovery (see Gagnon and Karolyi's, 2006 review of cross-listing studies), we identify three principal types of determinant. First and foremost, we consider China's iterative, step-by-step capital account liberalization programme, which began towards the beginning of our study period. Specifically, at the open of our sample period (1999), China had a closed capital account. By sample period end (2010), a non-trivial amount of permeability had been achieved, brought-on by a raft of policy initiatives as well as moves to allow partial RMB convertibility.
We hypothesize that such capital flows have been pivotal in moderating short-and long-run price leadership effects. Our second and third hypotheses relate to sentiment and liquidity effects. To help contextualize the three determinants, we also consider a range of control effects.
Policies Related to Capital Account Liberalization
Theoretical models of multimarket trading (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Domowitz et al., 1998; and Baruch et al., 2007) rely on the ability of informed or liquidity traders to freely choose trading location. In such accounts, unfettered capital flows are essential in purging mispricing. 20 Capital restrictions impede this process (see Bekaert et al., 2011) . The relaxation of any pre-existing capital control measures, in one or more market where a stock has cross-listing, should therefore boost price discovery. This issue is particularly relevant to China given recent capital account liberalization policies and earlier evidence of A-share market segmentation (Wang and Di Iorio (2007) .
At the beginning of our study period, China effectively ran an impenetrable capital account. In the present analysis, we utilize QFII quota as an overall proxy for foreign investment in the Ashare market (and not specifically a measure for A-share investment in cross-listed entities). Nonetheless, survey evidence (Tan, 2009: p. 358) suggests that QFIIs typically invest in large cap stocks, specifically the top-100 cap stocks in the A-market. As cross-listed entities are predominantly within this upper echelon, we conjecture that change in QFII quota is a valuable proxy for inward foreign investment into our sub-sample of firms. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1A posits that,
The A-share market's contribution to long-(short-) term price leadership has increased (decreased) with commensurate increases in inward capital flow, i.e. QFII investment.
If QFII investment enhances price discovery processes, cross-listed A-and H-share prices should be better synchronized. A corollary of this would be weaker short-term causality or lead-lag effects.
In a related hypothesis (H1B), we consider the effects of capital outflow from the Chinese mainland into Hong Kong. It is not clear as to which type of investor (i.e., foreign institutional or mainland Chinese domestic investor) bears greater influence on price discovery processes. For review of the literature on the influence of either or both channels, see Chan et al., (2008: p. 159-160) . Hypothesis On the other hand, as Chinese investors are overwhelmingly retail, and have been schooled in an emerging market environment, mainland capital outflows could add noise and volatility (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997) , and thus reduce the "informativeness" of H-prices.
Market Sentiment Effects
A given market's sentiment level also plays an important role in influencing the pricing behaviour of the majority of stocks listed in that setting (see Wang and Jiang, 2004; and Xu and Green, 2013 for respective Hong Kong and Shanghai-based studies). Further afield, Baker and Wurgler (2006) demonstrate that surges in investment sentiment have much greater impact on markets subject to arbitrage restrictions and on securities with more uncertain prospects. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) demonstrate greater mispricing of "good ("bad") earnings news" during surging ( (2008), we capture market sentiment in relation to general price-to-earnings (PE) levels. However, unlike Arquette et al. (2008) , we examine changes in such levels rather than absolute magnitudes. For the Amarket, we define variable ∆PE_A20, the percentage change in the A-market's overall PE level over a preceding 20 trading day period (equivalent to around one month's trading). For robustness reasons, we also examine market sentiment effects over 60-(3 months) and 120-trading day (6 months) periods 23 .
We hypothesize that rising price levels act to boost short-term causality and blunt long-term price leadership. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 contends that, Similarly, we capture market sentiment for the H-market by looking at changes in the market's general PE level (∆PE_H20). This allows us to test the related hypothesis, H2B.
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Hypothesis 2B: Rising H-market sentiment serves to weaken (strengthen) the Hmarket's contribution to long-(short-) term price leadership.
Liquidity and Trading Activities
In modelling the effect of market liquidity on multimarket trading, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) show that weaker market depth (i.e., the greater the price impact of an informed trade and the greater the trading cost) results in a lower likelihood of informed trading. Price "informativeness" is therefore inversely related to transaction cost. Price impact (or market depth) is one important dimension of liquidity. Essentially, the ease with which trading volumes are able to move prices captures the extent of price impact. Price impact is thus increasing in illiquidity. Amihud (2002) reports a strong positive association between price impact (i.e., illiquidity) and US excess market returns. We conjecture that A-(H-) leadership weakens in long-term price discovery as A-(H-) illiquidity increases. Likewise, A-(H-) market leadership weakens in short-term price discovery as A-(H-) illiquidity increases.
Similarly, we note the importance of differential trading activities as a measure of liquidity.
Volume also serves as a powerful indicator of where fundamental information is revealed. Baruch et al.'s (2007) analysis of order fragmentation in cross-listed stocks demonstrates that the market that more readily captures private information likely dominates in volume terms. Nonetheless, volumes reveal much less information in emerging markets dominated by noise traders (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997) .
The literature on liquidity trading also provides a useful guide on the 'informativeness' of volume. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1994) identify an inverse association between liquidity trading and information asymmetry levels. Eun and Sabherwal's (2003) examination of co-integration and two-way price adjustment effects for Canadian stocks listed in Toronto and the US is also pertinent. They find that the US contribution to price discovery (as measured by error-correction coefficients) is positively related to the US proportion of a stock's overall volume as well as "to the ratio of proportions of informative trades" (p. 549). They also note a weakening effect on US price discovery as the US to Toronto bid-ask spread ratio rises.
By assessing Chinese issuers, and a long time-series, we extend Eun and Sabherwal (2003) . We construct two liquidity (illiquidity) measures, the first of which is based on the Amihud (2002) measure. 24 Accordingly, Illiq_A (Illiq_H) is the average ratio of daily absolute returns to the RMB value of A-(H-) share trading, and is calculated for each firm i on day t using a 20-day rolling window of observations (from t-20 to t-1). Second, following Gagnon and Karolyi (2009) Information Risk: Greater price discovery should emerge as information gaps narrow. We capture differences in the two markets' processing of information in relation to year-end earnings announcements. In theory, such announcements provide insights into fundamentals and should help bolster long-term price discovery processes. For a given issuer, we construct a dummy variable with value one for each of the 20 trading days in the period 10 days prior to 10-days post year-end earnings announcements. By aggregating across all pairings, we arrive at dummy AccAnn.
The A-('home') market may have an advantage in 'interpreting' the broader background to important corporate and macro/policy announcement (Lee, Li and Wang, 2010) . Moreover, Lee et al. (2010) show that retail investors in the A-market trade more aggressively in relation to major corporate disclosures and key market pronouncements. Rather than bolstering long-term price discovery, such announcements might accelerate short-term A-to H-causality effects. At the same time, Li, Brockman and Zurbruegg (2015) reveal that H-prices are more efficient in capturing "firm-specific information".
We also control for idiosyncratic risk. Recent analyses in Pontiff (2006) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b) point to the overarching role of idiosyncratic risk in limiting arbitrage. Gagnon and Karolyi's (2010b) assessment of more than 500 ADRs demonstrates that the greater the idiosyncratic risk level of a stock the larger the home-to-ADR pricing gap. Therefore, causality effects should be increasing in arbitrage cost. Accordingly, stocks with greater idiosyncratic risk should exhibit stronger causality effects. Pure or riskless arbitrage is severely constrained by short-sale proscriptions in the A-market as well as the non-fungible nature of A-and H-share trading. However, China's recent capital account liberalization reforms, have given impetus to indirect or 'risky' arbitrage. Our analysis of arbitrage relates to this 'risky' form. Nonetheless, the absence of A-and H-fungibility relegates the issue of idiosyncratic risk to second-order status in this study.
We measure idiosyncratic risk using the Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b, p. 63) Finally, we control for one of the study period's most important equity market reforms, namely China's Split Share Reform. 26 The Reform entailed widespread conversion of non-tradable (principally stateheld) stock into tradable form. One would expect increased float size to support to price discovery. 25 . Unlike Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a) , and due to A-/H-trading overlap, we measure specific risk without lead/lag adjustment. 26 . For discussion, see McGuinness, 2009 . As background, the Scheme began in 'Pilot' form in April 2005 and continued for much of the remainder of our sample period, 2005-10. The Scheme's basic thrust was to transform non-tradable stock into tradable A-share form. Given the potentially deleterious impact on A-prices arising from disposals, extensive trading moratoria were applied to newly tradable stock. Various other safeguards were also applied as a means of dampening any risk premium on state share disposals. These included bonus payments to existing A-share investors and, decisively, CSRC thresholds and SASAC approval requirements for disposals. The various protections and lock-ins imposed on the newly transformed stock helped stem market participants' fears of large-scale state share disposals. Such fears had risen palpably in the years prior (2001-4) to the Reform but were largely dispelled by the programme's successful implementation in 2005-6. A scheme announced in 2001, enabling state-owners to sell existing holdings via A-share IPO, triggered a sell-off. Even though the scheme was subsequently cancelled, the risk surrounding future possible state share disposals lingered over the A-share market.
Specifically, we contend that an increase in the proportional tradable A-float contributes to enhanced long-term A-price leadership. We deploy variable ΔNontrade_A to capture the changing A-float resulting from 'Split Share Reform'. This variable is framed as the 20-day rolling change in the aggregate number of non-tradable A-shares to the total number of tradable and non-tradable shares outstanding. Tables 3 and 4 summarize variable forms and descriptive statistics. ************************************ Tables 3 and 4 ************************************ Table 4 reveals a mean quota for the QFII scheme (relative to the size of China's stock market) of only 0.37 basis points with a mean change of 0.02 basis points. In terms of ChinInv, mainland Chinese investors contributed on an average to 2.4 per cent of Hong Kong's total turnover. In contrast to Hong Kong's price-to-earnings ratio (PER), Shanghai's PER generally fell across the sample period. This observation is reflected by the negative (positive) mean PER changes we observe for Shanghai (Hong Kong). The large range in PER change suggests considerable variation in market sentiment over the study period. For instance, the percentage monthly change in Shanghai's PE ratio ranges from -35 to 23 percent.
Empirical assessment of the Determinants of causality
Descriptive data for the price impact measure (Illiq) reveals the A-market to be considerably more liquid than the H-market. The average A-price impact is 0.16 per cent return per million RMB of trading value, as compared to 5.79 per cent for the H-market. The inference to be drawn is that for the two markets to have the same proportionate price impact, trading activity in the A-market would need to be 36 times that of the H-market. A smaller figure applies when focusing on the median gap. Market turnover also declined over time (i.e., average de-trended turnovers, Tov_A and Tov_H, are negative).
Statistics for variable AccAnn indicate that companies' earnings occur within a relatively narrow reporting season. The idiosyncratic risk measure Idio exhibits substantial variation over the study period.
Finally, descriptive statistics for variable FwdPrem reveal a pronounced discount on the 12-month RMB forward contract. This is suggestive of an average expectation of RMB appreciation (against the USD) across the 12-year period. As expected, the proportion of non-tradable A-stock fell over the [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] time-frame; declining at an average rate of 0.16 per cent per month.
The final set of variables in Table 4 In order to test the three hypotheses (H1-H3) of price leadership, we employ a generalized least square (GLS) regression approach. The dependent variables (i.e., Pcnt_A_contr, Pcnt_H_contr, Pcnt_A→H and Pcnt_H→A) are functions of estimated causality parameters discovered from our first stage estimations in Section 3. We adopt Saxonhouse's (1976) weighted procedure to address a potential generated regressor problem in the two-stage estimation set-up 27 . As Hornstein and Greene (2012) stress, when the dependent variable in the second stage regression is a non-linear function of estimated parameters from the first, the weighting matrix should be the inverse of the variance of the estimated function of the parameter (rather than the variance of the estimated parameter itself). We follow Hornstein and Greene (2012) in computing the variance of the variance of the indicated dummy in terms of the Amarket's contribution to long run price discovery (Pcnt_A_contr). This is as follows: 27 . In this approach, the inverse of the variance of estimated parameters from stage one is used to weight observations in second stage GLS regressions (see Waring, 1996 and Greene et al., 2009 for relevant applications).
(6)
Where is an indicated function, which takes on value one when the stated condition is met and zero otherwise. and are the mean and standard error of the parameters estimated from Equation (2). The is calculated, on the assumption that follows a normal distribution . The aggregate function for the variable for a given day is .
The parameter is selected for each stock pairing from the state with highest probability. The variance of this aggregated function is calculated by summing the variance of each indicated function and dividing by the square of the number of stocks (N). The underlying premise is that stock pairing parameters are independently distributed parameters among the stock parings. We obtain the variance of other indicated functions, for the remaining error correction parameter , and the two short-term causality parameters and , in a similar manner. The inverse of the variance is used as the weighting matrix in second stage GLS regressions.
We also adjust for autocorrelation in residuals using lagged dependent variables of up to five lags.
To address potential heteroscedasticity induced by a generated regressor problem, we apply White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent correction. A VIF of less than five highlights the general absence of multicollinearity effects. 
advantage. Such an effect, if it exists, should be captured by the intercept term in relevant regressions.
Consistent with this view, we document larger intercept terms in regressions for both long-and short-term H-price discovery (relative to those for long-and short-term A-price leadership) 28 .
************************************ Table 5 ************************************
Policies Related to Capital Account Liberalization (H1)
We first note that greater external fund flows, as evident from the significant positive coefficient on ΔQFII (ChinInv) in Model 1 (2), galvanize the contribution of the A-(H-) market to long-run price discovery. Furthermore, greater mainland Chinese investor participation on HKEx appears to weaken short-term H-to A-causality. Overall, the findings support the contentions in Hypotheses H1A and H1B.
That is, relaxation of capital controls boosts long term price discovery processes and inhibits short-term lead-lag effects. More specifically, results suggest that capital account liberalization boosts information transmission (Bekaert et al., 2011) . 29 Our findings also reinforce evidence that external fund flows enhance local price discovery (Frino et al., 2012) and efficiency (Schuppli and Bohl, 2010) .
Differential Market Sentiment (H2) & Liquidity and Trading (H3) Effects
The negative coefficient on ΔPE_A and ΔPE_H in respective Models (1) and (2) of Table 5 indicates that stronger sentiment in a given setting weakens that market's contribution to long-term price discovery. A given market's leading role thus weakens with rising PER levels; this is especially so for the H-share market where the relevant coefficient is highly significant. This finding is consistent with greater mispricing in momentum-or sentiment-driven markets (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012; and 28 . We thank the reviewer for alerting us to this possible non-synchronous trading effect. 29 . In the Chinese market context, the tight capital controls of earlier years, allied to excessive savings rates, combined to keep mainland Chinese investors' required rates of return at much lower levels than their international counterparts. Chinese investors' discount rates have logically risen with the gradual easing of capital restrictions. Such effect is also consistent with arguments in Bekeart et al. (2011: 3877) on globalization effects on discount rates. Of additional interest, Chang, Luo and Ren (2013) show that A-share IPO underpricing is exacerbated by the "anchoring" of the offer price to the stock's pre-existing H-share price. Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan, 2013) . Interestingly, rising sentiment also weakens short-term causality (see Models 3 and 4). Taken together, our findings suggest that sentiment in one market does not necessarily spill-over to the other related market setting. Overall, and in long-run price discovery terms, results offer some support for Hypotheses H2B.
Results in Table 5 point to a strong inverse association between price impact (i.e., illiquidity) and long-term price leadership. This applies in respect of both Illiq_A and Illiq_H (Models 1 and 2) and is consistent with hypotheses H3A and H3B. Moreover, the results support predictions in Chowdhury and Nanda (1991) that higher price impact (as an indicator of lower liquidity) discourages informed trading.
There is also some indication that higher price impact inhibits short-term price leadership. This holds for the H-market (Model 4), which generally has lower liquidity than the related A-market. For the A-market, the picture is a little different. In respect of Model 3, while Illiq_A is positive short-term A-to H-causality effects are nonetheless insignificant.
For the second measure of liquidity, finding complements results for developed markets (see Baruch et al., 2007 and Karolyi, 2009 ). Increased trading activity also appears to boost short-term price discovery processes, especially in relation to H-to A-causality (Model 4). Overall, and in relation to the illiquidity and trading activity measures we employ, hypotheses H3A and H3B receive a strong measure of support. Our analysis provides a new application in the price impact literature (Amihud, 2002; and Gagnon and Karolyi, 2009) by assessing liquidity in relationship to Chinese A-and H-markets price leadership issues.
Control Effects
Arbitrage risk: In periods with greater levels of idiosyncratic risk, the H-market appears to play a more dominant role in long-term price discovery. This is consistent with H-market investors being more adept at identifying firm specific risk factors. This evidence complements analyses in Pontiff (2006) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b) . For the present study, the H-market exhibits a longer-term price discovery advantage over the A-market for stocks with high idiosyncratic (specific) risk levels.
Information risk:
In respect of Models 1 and 2, results for AccAnn indicate that the A-share market plays less of a long-run leadership role during earnings announcement periods. Furthermore, consistent with a possible 'home' advantage effect, results for Model 3 indicate stronger short-term A-to H-causality during such periods. However, the weakening of the long-run effect suggests that any 'home'-based information advantage is transitory and probably the result of 'noisy' spillovers. This finding is broadly consistent with Lee, Li and Wang's (2010: p. 116 ) account of greater A-market retail trading (a proxy for noise effects) around key corporate reporting dates. Table 5 reveals that rising expectations of RMB appreciation (i.e., lower FwdPrem values) strengthen the H-market's long-and short-run leadership roles. Results in Models 2 and 4 suggest that firming expectations of RMB appreciation induce greater foreign investment in China-related stocks. In this sense, increased H-investment boosts market liquidity and helps squeeze the long-term H-to A-pricing discount (see Arquette et al., 2008) .
Currency Expectation & 'Split Share Reform':

30
Results in Table 5 (Model 1) also suggest that the conversion of non-tradable stock into tradable A-form has bolstered the A-market's contribution to long-term price discovery.
Robustness Check
To check for robustness of results, we conduct two alternative specification tests. First, due to the absence of QFII quota prior to 2003, the pivotal ΔQFII variable takes-on value zero in the early part of our sample-frame, 1999-2002. To confirm that overall results are robust after exclusion of this sub-period, we re-estimate models using the later 2003 to 2010 subsample. Table 6 reports relevant results. Principal findings remain. However there is a noticeable difference in the significance of the negative effect of sentiment on long-term price discovery. Specifically, Table 6 reveals that stronger sentiment in the A-market significantly weakens A-market leadership. Sentiment effects in relation to H-leadership (Model 2) remain at very similar levels in Table 5 and 6 results.
In a second set of robustness tests we further deepen findings by considering relative differences in market sentiment, liquidity and activity measures. This area of analysis (Table 7) complements our findings in relation to the absolute sentiment, liquidity and activity measures of a given (A-or H-) market (Tables 5 and 6 ). Additional regression results in Table 7 incorporate the relative measures
PE_change_A_H, Illiq_A_H and Tov_A_H (see Table 3 for variable definitions and Table 4 for associated descriptive statistics). Results in Table 7 help to extend our findings in regard to sentiment, liquidity and activity effects. Specifically, the relative measures reveal that higher A-price impact (relative to H-) coincides with greater one-way causality effects from H-to A-prices. In terms of activity, greater Amarket turnover (relative to H-) is congruent with stronger A-price leadership. This last result reinforces the findings in Table 6 . Results in Tables 6 and 7 are thus complementary in revealing how strong daily turnover in the A-market (both in absolute terms and relative to H-market volumes) underlies long-run A-to H-share price leadership effects.
************************************ Tables 6 and 7 ************************************
Conclusions
The present study offers two major contributions. First, we decompose price leadership into short-and long-run dimensions. As a contribution to the literature on cross-listings, for both Chinese (Wang and Jiang, 2004; Arquette et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2010; and Cai et al., 2011) and global issuers (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010a) , we identify varying degrees of short-and long-term price leadership. The second contribution relates to our assessment of the determinants of long-and short-run price leadership.
We find that capital control reform is central to changes in the short-and long-run price discovery dynamic between A-and H-prices. Specifically, the A-market's role in long-term price discovery strengthens with increased capital inflow (i.e., ΔQFII investment). Consistent with this picture, greater mainland Chinese capital outflow into Hong Kong accentuates long-term price discovery in H-prices.
Such capital movement also inhibits short-term causality effects (especially from H-to A-when Chinese capital outflow is on the up). Our findings strongly suggest that capital account liberalization boosts longrun price discovery (Bekaert et al., 2011) and reduces short-term non-synchronicity of prices. Results are consistent with external fund flows galvanizing domestic market price discovery (Frino et al., 2012) . By deploying specific inward and outward capital flow measures, we significantly extend prior work on Aand H-pricing (most specifically Cai et al., 2011) and market efficiency (Schuppli and Bohl, 2010) .
As an important subsidiary finding we report that a given market's long-and short-term price discovery function generally weakens as its price-to-earnings move strongly upward. Such findings are consistent with surging investor sentiment promoting greater amounts of mispricing and detracting from price discovery (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012 and Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan, 2013) . In addition, we find that greater price impact (i.e., lower market depth or greater illiquidity) in a particular setting weakens that market's contribution to long-run price discovery. Such results support predictions in Chowdhury and Nanda (1991) by suggesting that higher price impact discourages informed trading.
Consistent with results on price impact, higher trading volumes galvanize long-and short-run price discovery (see Baruch et al., 2007 and Karolyi, 2009 ).
Additionally, we examine a number of other effects potentially relevant to cross-border price discovery. These relate to earnings announcement effects, arbitrage costs (Pontiff, 2006; and Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010b) and key structural changes to China's issuers and its macro-economic environment.
Among other things, expectations of RMB currency revaluation are significant in driving causality effects.
However, information effects from earnings, China's 'Split Share Reform' and arbitrage risk (or idiosyncratic cost) appear as second-order factors in explaining price discovery.
Finally, there are three overarching reasons why our study of cross-listed A-and H-pricing is of international importance. First, suggestions of an impending move by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to introduce an international board may mean that foreign issuers will soon be able to list on the Chinese mainland (see Ren, 2013 for recent discussion).
Second, reforms to ramp-up existing QFII and RQFII (i.e., RMB QFII) schemes will undoubtedly invite greater international investor penetration, and thus further galvanize A-and H-price-discovery processes. 31 As a third important international contribution, our analysis significantly extends the empirical literature on capital flows between developed market settings and/or for securities traded in major overseas markets (see, for example, Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Grammig, Melvin and Schlag, 2005; Pascual, Pascual-Fuster and Climent, 2006; and Frino et al., 2012) . More particularly, we offer insights for a unique setting in which emerging and developed markets co-exist in close proximity, but differ in terms of regulatory/legal structures. This special Chinese environment allows refined insights into the impact of capital reform on price discovery processes. In a general sense, the present study's findings offer important background for policy makers in other settings where capital account reform is on the horizon. H,t are the turnover ratio of a stock at day t for A-and Hmarket trading respectively. They are defined as the day's trading volume divided by the total number of shares in issue. This is de-trended by subtracting the 20-day moving average of prior days' volumes. Following Gagnon and Karolyi (2009) , we add a constant (a=0.00000255) to avoid problems with zero volumes. Tov_A_H Tov_A_H measures the difference in the turnover ratio in the A-and H-market trading (= Tov_A -Tov_H).
Tov
Additional control variables AccAnn
Percentage of companies in the year-end earnings announcement period, defined as the 20-day period beginning 10 days prior to announcement and ending 10 days after. Table 5 Determinants of error-correction and causality: Regression with de-trended QFII
The sample contains 3,047 observations, for trading days from January 1999 to December 2010. All explanatory variables are as defined in Table 3 . AR1 to AR5 variables are included in regressions to control for serial correlation in the error term. We also report heteroscedasticity consistent t statistics, which when marked by ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.
Long-term price discovery models Short-term price discovery models Table 6 Determinants of error-correction and causality: Subsample analysis from QFII quota commencement (2003) to 2010
The sample contains 1,978 observations, for trading days from June 2003 to December 2010. All explanatory variables are as defined in Table 3 . AR1 to AR5 variables are included in regressions to control for serial correlation in the error term. We also report heteroscedasticity consistent t statistics, which when marked by ***, ** and * are significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.
Long-term price discovery models Short-term price discovery models Table 7 Determinants of error-correction and causality: Utilizing relative measures ΔPE_A_H, Illiq_A_H and Tov_A_H
(1) (2) (3) 
